The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a 'young science'; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings ...
For in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion ... The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have a means of solving the problems which trouble us, though the problems and the method pass each other by.
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations Sec. II, p. 232e 1
Introduction
Wittgenstein offers a grave assessment of the state of psychologyone that falls just short of complete condemnation. Taken seriously, it should be a cause of concern for anyone working in the discipline today. But, should it been taken seriously? Was Wittgenstein's evaluation ever justified? More urgently, is it still an accurate portrayal of psychology as practiced today? This chapter argues it was and still is, and that this fact highlights an urgent and inescapable need for conceptual clarification in psychology. As a prelude to making this case, it is useful to get clearer about what motivated Wittgenstein's characterization of psychology as 'barren' because conceptually confused.
Wittgensteinian backstory
It might be thought that Wittgenstein's remark about psychology is inspired by nothing other than a general shunning or condemnation of science, an expression of a general anti-scientific attitude. If so, perhaps his negative assessment of the condition of psychology can be put down to nothing other than an unjustified general dislike of science. While it might be tempting to assume this, such a reading lacks credibility. The first thing to note is that when Wittgenstein speaks of conceptual confusions in the cited passage, he takes these to be of a distinctively philosophical kind -viz. they have a source and character that makes it impossible to overcome them by the provision of better or more refined theories, explanations or empirical studies. Focusing on this, noticeably, he makes no complaint about psychology's methodology, only its conceptual grasp of its subject matter. What this brings out is that the conceptual confusion that troubles psychology is reallyat root -philosophical confusion (albeit exhibited in this instance by psychologists and not professional philosophers). Not surprisingly then, Wittgenstein reserves his most critical assessments not for the sciences but for the bankrupt state of philosophy and philosophers. It is philosophers who utter nonsense, who are in the grip of pictures, who are 'like savages, primitive people, who hear the expressions of civilized men, put a false interpretation on them, and then draw the queerest conclusions from it' (PI, §194). Hence, 'a philosophical problem has the form: "I don't know my way about"' (PI, §123). Scientists, however, have no natural immunity to intellectual diseases of this sort; and when they do suffer from them, the only possible treatment for their condition takes the form of philosophical work.
It is simply false that Wittgenstein is anti-science. What he does reject is the seductive scientistic view that the scientific method and outlook should dominate all thinking; that all problems and questions reduce to scientific ones. In particular, if the scientific method is not appropriate for dealing with philosophical problems of the sort that arise from conceptual confusions, then making new discoveries or acquiring deeper knowledge of phenomena through the manufacture of better, more penetrating theories cannot possibly solve or address them.
With this in mind, Wittgenstein rejects all attempts to provide philosophical explanations (which he thinks only breed more myths and confusions) in favour of a purely descriptive approach. He is utterly clear about the notion of explanation that he has in his sights and which he rejects:
I mean the method of reducing the explanation of natural phenomena to the smallest possible number of primitive natural laws; and in mathematics, of unifying the treatment of different topics by using generalization.
